UK Trip Part I: Executive Compensation

I just returned from a trip to the UK where I spent four days touring London and then four days at Cambridge University where I gave a talk about the mortgage crisis in the United States. It struck me perusing the London media just how many of the banking problems in the UK mirror those in the US and even more striking, how the rhetoric matches word-for-word.

A British tabloid-style newspaper—The Independent—ran a headline on August 4: ‘Big bonuses? It would be wrong to stop paying them.’ Beneath it ran the subheading: "Barclays’ £50m-a-year boss delivers a defiant rebuff to critics who say bankers are overpaid." Quotes in the article could have been lifted from the financial section of any newspaper in the US. Here is a sampling:

“performance-related bonus payments were vital given the bank's "obligation to run a client-first business”

“It is pay for performance and it is based on principles we have followed for a while now.”

“It would be wrong for the bank not to pay out ‘if we had really good performance.’”

And my favorite quote described seven-figure bonuses as:

“essential if we want people to work in our industry”

When I returned home, the first headline I saw in my local paper, the Baltimore Sun read: “CEOs paid more even as profits fall” followed by the subheading: “Debate swirls as most of the area's 10 top-earning CEOs receive higher compensation during a recession that has dragged down many companies' stock prices and profits.”

The reporters analyzed the compensation for 20 Baltimore-area companies that paid their CEO at least $1 million and found that 17 received compensation increases even though in most cases company profits fell. The reporters obtain their compensation figures from documents filed with the SEC. The company spokepersons who responded to questions couldn’t give the usual “pay for performance” justification without sounding completely out of touch with reality. Instead elaborate mathematical manipulations were offered to convince everyone that the figures for executive pay on SEC-required filings were misleading because of SEC-enforced rules. The spokespersons insisted that the pay the CEOs actually received was much lower. I don’t know if I should take comfort in the argument that federal law requires that SEC documents misrepresent actual pay.

It occurred to me as I read the articles in Baltimore and London that no matter what order of magnitude is attached to compensation figures, spokespersons for the industry will argue that it must be at that level. As the recession squeezes budgets, teachers with 5-figure incomes warn public education will suffer if salaries are cut, medical doctors making 6-figure incomes warn that public health will suffer if government-run healthcare puts limits on their income, and here we have bankers with 7-figure incomes arguing that banks will fail to function if CEO compensation is limited. It appears that compensation is like closet space, no matter how much you have, expenses will expand to require all of it. Any reduction in income then becomes unimaginable.

However, I find the logic for executive compensation interesting on many different levels. First it would be interesting to know if independent studies have found cause and effect relationships between executive pay and company performance. Recently I came across a study on the relationship between the cost of executive homes and company performance.

Two business professors, Crocker H. Liu and David Yermack, conducted a study reported in a paper titled: "Where are the Shareholders Mansions? CEOs Home Purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company Performance." The study found an inverse relationship between company performance and CEO stock sales to finance large real estate purchases. In other words the bigger the CEO’s home the worse the company performs. The authors concluded that, “regardless of the source of finance, future company performance deteriorates when CEOs acquire extremely large or costly mansions and estates.” It is wrong to generalize from a single study but it does suggest that the justifications for high executive compensation might not hold up when the facts are examined.

A large part of the problem as Jay Hancock pointed out in a recent column is that CEO pay is not negotiated with the company owners. Boards of directors determine CEO pay, not the shareholders who actually own the company. As a result market forces don’t work, an observation made by the father of free-market capitalist principles Adam Smith more than two centuries ago. It is worth reading the entire section below from Smith’s treatise The Wealth of Nations because it describes exactly the problems with executive pay today.

“The trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a court of directors. This court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the control of a general court of proprietors. But the greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend to understand anything of the business of the company, and when the spirit of faction happens not to prevail among them, give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such half-yearly or yearly dividend as the directors think proper to make to them. This total exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond a limited sum, encourages many people to become adventurers in joint stock companies, who would, upon no account, hazard their fortunes in any private copartnery. Such companies, therefore, commonly draw to themselves much greater stocks than any private copartnery can boast of. The trading stock of the South Sea Company, at one time, amounted to upwards of thirty-three millions eight hundred thousand pounds. The divided capital of the Bank of England amounts, at present, to ten millions seven hundred and eighty thousand pounds. The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company. It is upon this account that joint stock companies for foreign trade have seldom been able to maintain the competition against private adventurers. They have, accordingly, very seldom succeeded without an exclusive privilege, and frequently have not succeeded with one. Without an exclusive privilege they have commonly mismanaged the trade. With an exclusive privilege they have both mismanaged and confined it.”

Adam Smith understood that “negligence and profusion” would always prevail in the management of publicly traded companies because the directors are not the owners. Of course newspapers like to report on the excesses of high-living executives and print their self-serving explanations because of the public outrage stirred. There is an obvious “two-headed quarter” in play that angers people. Executives profit handsomely when performance is good and profit handsomely when performance is bad.

However, I see an attitude that is even more deeply troubling. Beyond the conflicts of interest Adam Smith described, the idea that seven-figure salaries are essential or there would be no executives might be a more revealing testament to the cause of dysfunction in corporate America.

For most people pay is a necessary condition to work but not sufficient. Motivating people to do a job well usually requires more than money. For many people work is an opportunity to perform a social good and contribute to a cause larger than oneself. Teachers teach and doctors practice for reasons beyond money.

But, the apologists for high executive pay, talk about compensation and performance only in monetary terms. This is an attitude that does a disservice to the majority of their own employees. When I go into my bank the people who work there seem genuine in wanting to help me. It is a social transaction, not just financial.

I am well aware that in any industry, compensation is determined by market forces that have more to do with scarcity than the value of the work to society. It is for those reasons major league baseball players will always make orders of magnitude more than teachers. But success in teaching and sports is usually defined in non-financial terms. To do the work requires a desire for more than just money.

The evaluation of executives needs to include more than just financial measures. There needs to be ethical and societal dimensions when evaluating the performance of executives because the decisions they make have impacts far beyond the company stock price. The underlying assumption behind performance evaluation—rising stock price equals good; falling stock price equals bad—is overly simplistic. When large companies fail many more people than the shareholders lose.

Joseph Ganem is a physicist and author of the award-winning The Two Headed Quarter: How to See Through Deceptive Numbers and Save Money on Everything You Buy

The Widening Gap Between High School and College Math

An article in the Baltimore Sun this past week: “A Failing Grade for Maryland Math,” highlighted a problem that I believe is not unique to Maryland. The author, Liz Bowie, explained that the math taught in Maryland high schools is deemed insufficient by many colleges. More and more entering college students are required to take remedial math. In many cases incoming college students cannot do basic arithmetic even after passing all the high school math tests.

The article resonated with me because in recent years I’ve witnessed first hand the disconnect between high school and college math curricula. As a parent of three children with current ages 14, 17, and 20, I’ve done my share of tutoring of middle school and high school math. The problems assigned to my children have become progressively more difficult through the years to the point of being bizarre. My wife keeps shaking her head at how parents without my level of math expertise assist their children.

For example, my eighth-grade daughter asked me one evening how to perform “matrix inversions.” This is a technique I teach in a college sophomore-level mathematical methods course for physics majors. Matrix inversion is difficult for me to do off the top of my head. I needed to refresh my memory by referring to a highly advanced math book. Another night my daughter brought home a word problem that was easy for me to do with my advanced knowledge of differential equations but it took me a lot of thought to arrive at an explanation comprehensible to an eighth-grader.

My other daughter struggled through a high-school trigonometry course filled with problems that I might assign to my upper-class physics majors. I certainly wouldn’t assign problems at such a high level to college freshmen. I kept asking her how she was taught to do the problems. I wondered if the teacher knew special techniques unknown to me that made solving them much easier. Alas no such techniques ever materialized. The problems were as difficult as I judged. At least I could solve the problems, a feat the teacher couldn’t manage in a number of cases.

At the same time I work the summer orientation sessions at Loyola College registering incoming freshmen for classes. Time and again students cannot pass the placement exam for college calculus. Many students cannot pass the exam for pre-calculus and that saddles them with a non-credit remedial math course. Without the ability to take college-level math the choices students have for majors are severely limited. No college-level math course means not majoring in any of the sciences, engineering, computer, business, or social science programs.

A colleague in the engineering department complained to me that many students who wanted to major in engineering could not place into calculus. The engineering program is structured so that no calculus means no physics freshmen year and no physics means no engineering courses until it’s too late to complete the program in four years. For all practical purposes readiness for calculus as an entering freshmen determines choice of major and career. The math placement test given to incoming freshmen at orientation has much higher stakes than any test given in high school. But, the placement test has no course grade or teacher evaluation associated with it. No one but the student has any responsibility for its outcome.

So if eighth graders are taught math at the level of a college sophomore why are graduating seniors struggling? From my knowledge of both curricula I see three problems.

1. Confusing difficulty with rigor. It appears to me that the creators of the grade school math curricula believe that “rigor” means pushing students to do ever more difficult problems at a younger age. It’s like teaching difficult concerti to novice musicians before they master the basics of their instruments. Rigor—defined by the dictionary in the context of mathematics as a “scrupulous or inflexible accuracy”—is best obtained by learning age-appropriate concepts and techniques. Attempting difficult problems without the proper foundation is actually an impediment to developing rigor.


2. Mistaking process for understanding. Just because a student can perform a technique that solves a difficult problem doesn’t mean that he or she understands the problem. There is a delightful story recounted by Nobel-prize winning physicist Richard Feynman in his book Surely You're Joking, Mr.Feynman!: Adventures of a Curious Character
about an arithmetic competition between him and an abacus salesman. (The incident happened in the 1950’s before the invention of calculators.) Here is the link to the full text of the story.

Feynman and the abacus salesman competed on who could do arithmetic faster. Feynman lost when the problems were simple addition. But he was very competitive at multiplication and won easily at the apparently impossible task of finding a cubed root. The salesman was totally bewildered by the outcome. How can Feynman have a comparative advantage at hard problems when he lags far behind at the easy ones? But when Feynman tried to explain his techniques he discovered the salesman had no understanding of arithmetic. All he does is move beads on an abacus. It was not possible for Feynman to teach the salesman additional mathematics because despite appearances he understood absolutely nothing.

This is the problem with teaching eight-graders techniques such as matrix inversion. The arithmetic steps can be memorized but it will be a long time, if ever, before the concept and motivation for the process is understood. That raises the question of what exactly is being accomplished with such a curricula? Learning techniques without understanding them does no good in preparing students for college. At the college level emphasis is on understanding, not memorization and computation prowess.


3. Teaching concepts that are developmentally inappropriate. Teaching advanced algebra in middle school pushes concepts on students that are beyond normal development at that age. Walking is not taught to six-month olds and reading is not taught to two-year olds because children are not developmentally ready at those ages for those skills. It is very difficult to short-cut development. All teachers dream of arriving at a crystal clear explanation of a concept that will cause an immediate “aha” moment for the student. But those flashes of insight cannot happen until the student is developmentally ready. Because math involves knowledge, skill and understanding of symbolic representations for abstract concepts it is extremely difficult to short cut development.

When I tutored my other daughter in seventh grade algebra, in her words she “found it creepy” that I knew how to do every single problem in her rather large textbook. When I related the remark to a fellow physicist he said: “But its algebra. There are only three or four things you have to know.” Yes, but it took me years of development before I understood there were only a few things you had to know to do algebra. I can’t tell my seventh grader or anyone else without the proper developmental background the few things you have to know for algebra and send them off to do every problem in the book.

All three of these problems are the result of the adult obsession with testing and the need to show year-to-year improvement in test scores. Age-appropriate development and understanding of mathematical concepts does not advance at a rate fast enough to please test-obsessed lawmakers. But adults using test scores to reward or punish other adults are doing a disservice to the children they claim to be helping.

It does not matter the exact age that you learned to walk. What matters is that you learned to walk at a developmentally appropriate time. To do my job as a physicist I need to know matrix inversion. It didn’t hurt my career that I learned that technique in college rather than in eighth grade. What mattered was that I understood enough about math when I got to college that I could take calculus. Memorizing a long list of advanced techniques to appease test scorers does not constitute an understanding.

Joseph Ganem is a physicist and author of the award-winning The Two Headed Quarter: How to See Through Deceptive Numbers and Save Money on Everything You Buy

Overdue Warnings on Acetaminophen

The news that the government is issuing stronger warnings about acetaminophen and possibly banning its use in some products is long overdue. Because of my own experiences, I have been mystified by perceptions of the safety of this drug for years. To me the medical community appeared as oblivious as the public.

Like most people, I believed acetaminophen to be very safe drug. In 2003 I had an illness with a high fever that continued for more than a week. I had never in my life, before or since, been so sick. The fever was so debilitating that to stay lucid I found myself taking the maximum recommended dose of acetaminophen each day. The chills and sweats came back as soon as each dose wore off and every six hours I popped more pills.

After a week elapsed with no improvement I went to see a doctor. He examined me and said that I appeared to have hepatitis. Blood work would be necessary to confirm the diagnosis. He drew the blood and sent me home.

How could I have hepatitis? I immediately started to read about the disease to learn more about the different types and causes. Hepatitis is a general term that refers to an inflammation of the liver. It is not a single disease because there are a number of causes of liver inflammation. If the condition continues untreated it can lead to liver failure.

After learning about the different viral causes of hepatitis I started reading about chemical causes. A number of drugs can inflame the liver but the most common drug-induced hepatitis is caused by acetaminophen.

Learning that fact caused the science part of my brain took over. What hypotheses can I form given the data and how can each be tested. I could construct two cause and effects narratives to fit the data.

1. I have hepatitis that caused a fever and in response I took acetaminophen.
2. I have a fever that caused me to take acetaminophen and in response I developed hepatitis.

The doctor had jumped quickly to testing the first hypothesis. But, given my unlikely exposure to any viral form of the disease, it occurred to me that the second hypothesis was the most plausible. I stopped taking acetaminophen and in a few days the hepatitis symptoms went away. The doctor called back to say that I tested negative for all the viral forms of the disease. He never asked about acetaminophen or mentioned its use as a potential problem.

I eventually recovered from the illness. It took almost a month before I felt completely well. To this day I don’t know what I had. Most likely it was some random viral infection that it took my immune system a long time to eliminate.

A few months later I crossed paths with a colleague who I had not talked to in a while. We inquired about each other’s families and he told me about a health crisis with his adult son. He began a story with remarkable parallels to my own. His son had an unexplained fever that went on for more than a week. The doctors did not know the cause and advised him to take acetaminophen to control the fever. But then his son’s experience took a harrowing divergence from my own. Following the doctor’s advice he continued to take acetaminophen for the fever and found himself hospitalized with liver failure.

My colleague said to me: “We had no idea acetaminophen could cause liver failure. We thought it was safe drug because the doctors kept telling him to take it.”

The makers of acetaminophen products—Tylenol, Nyquil, etc.—insist the drugs are safe when used as directed. But, I am skeptical about directions that include just two dosage variations—adult and child. There must be more variation in acetaminophen tolerance within the adult population. A one size fits all number for the recommended dosage for adults does not make sense.

For example, I am an almost exactly average adult male—5-feet 10-inches, 185 pounds, right-handed. That means almost all personal products—furniture, cars, homes, etc. and yes, drug dosages—are designed for me. All other people have to make adjustments when they use these products because I’m the person everything is designed for.

But, the dosing instructions for acetaminophen are too much for me to metabolize. Does that mean I have a less than average tolerance for the drug? How many other people are like me? What about the female half of the population? The current dosage instructions address none of these questions. Given the dangers of acetaminophen those questions should be addressed and the government is right to require warnings.

The most important lesson I learned from my experience is to ask these questions early and do independent research. Do not blindly follow dosing instructions on a package or follow “expert” advice from doctors who cannot think through all the possibilities in the short 10-minutes they allot for an exam. It took me some time and effort to figure out what was happening but the insights saved me from potentially dangerous complications.

Joseph Ganem is a physicist and author of the award-winning The Two Headed Quarter: How to See Through Deceptive Numbers and Save Money on Everything You Buy

Dropping the SAT Requirement at Loyola College

The announcement by the school where I teach, Loyola College, that it would no longer require SAT scores for applicants brought a vitriolic response from recent alumni that the Baltimore Sun published. That opinion piece generated a heated discussion on blogs that the Baltimore Sun published two days later.

I found deeply troubling the arguments made by the alumni for keeping the SAT requirement at Loyola and the tone of their reaction to the news disturbing. The assertion made in the opinion piece that making SAT’s optional for admission will “financially depreciate” the bachelor's degrees granted by Loyola is based on two underlying assumptions that are false.

First, admission to Loyola is not a guarantee of a degree from Loyola. Students have to do the work required to earn the degree. Admission standards should not be confused with academic standards. I am never told the SAT scores, high school grades, or any of the reasons the Loyola admitted the students in my classes. Honestly, I am not interested in any of that information.

I teach my subject to the students enrolled in the class and assigned grades based on performance expectations that have not changed throughout my career. SAT scores have no bearing on the criteria I have established for passing my courses.

I also serve on Loyola’s academic standards committee. At the end of each semester that committee is charged with reviewing student grades and dismissing any students who are not making satisfactory progress towards a degree. Again it is grades earned at Loyola that are reviewed, not the reasons the students were admitted. SAT scores have never entered into these discussions.

Second, college degrees have no “financial value” so it is not possible for them to “depreciate.” A degree is a non-transferable status that cannot be bought or sold. I know this seems like a strange assertion given the wide disparity between the average lifetime earnings of college graduates compared to those without college degrees. But students are mistaken if they believe that degrees are the cause of the higher income typically earned by college graduates.

No employer pays a person because he or she has a college degree. Employees are paid for the performance of work if it has sufficient value that it becomes in the financial best interest of the employer to pay. It happens that the knowledge, skills, and insights that are acquired through the process of obtaining a college degree often results in the ability to perform work that is of greater value to employers. But there are people without degrees who are highly paid because they perform valuable work. It is work that causes payment, not the abilities associated with the degree. Graduates who cannot establish themselves as productive workers will find that their degrees mean very little financially.

So do I think Loyola should become an SAT-optional school? I am in agreement with the new policy. I find the entire concept of “scholastic aptitude” that the SAT purports to measure suspect. Readiness for college depends on acquiring the necessary language, writing, and math skills necessary for college-level work. These are not “aptitudes” that a single test can measure, rather, these are skills acquired through study and practice.

Once in college success is more dependent on attitude than aptitude. Students will do well if they attend class, do the assigned work, and major in a subject that interests them. That sounds simple and trite, but my experience on the Academic Standards Committee has revealed that students who fail in college haven’t mastered those basic practices.

SAT scores were meant to provide a level playing field for college admission by putting students from all backgrounds on equal footing. But, as it usually happens when a number is substituted for judgment, inordinate amounts of time, effort, and expense are allocated toward manipulating the number. Witness the entire test preparation industry that has grown up because of the SAT. Spending thousands of dollars on SAT prep classes defeats the original purpose of a level playing field. It’s time to retire the number.

For recent graduates entering the workforce, college reputation and courses of study are important because it is all employers have as a basis for judging competence and abilities. But within four to five years of graduation it will be performance on the job that counts. For me it has now been 32 years since I entered college and 28 since I graduated. I no longer remember my SAT scores and if my alma mater, the University of Rochester, changes its SAT policy there would be no impact on my life—financial or otherwise.

Joseph Ganem is a physicist and author of the award-winning The Two Headed Quarter: How to See Through Deceptive Numbers and Save Money on Everything You Buy

The Neglect of Probability Bias: What is normal for the market?

The failures of large investment and insurance houses—Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae—demonstrate that the models these companies used to manage risk were deeply flawed. The defense offered by many on Wall Street is that market events of the past year have been so extreme, so far from the norm, no one could have predicted or planned for such as financial catastrophe. Repeatedly financial and political leaders have compared the past year to events of the Great Depression. It appears that the risk models failed because market contractions of the current magnitude were not considered a possibility.

Extreme events by definition have low probabilities of occurrence. But low probability does not equal zero probability. Was it reasonable for the financial analysts to consider current events in the markets so far outside the norm that they would not occur? I keep hearing that current market conditions are not normal. But, in reflecting back over the past few decades I’m hard-pressed to think of any time that was “normal.”

During the mid-1990s stocks increased so fast that investors not making 20% per year felt left out of the boom. At the beginning the bull market in 1995 the Standard and Poors 500 index increased 34% in that year alone. From 1995 to 1999 it had returns in excess of 19% for each of those 5 years, more than doubling its overall value. Plenty of warnings were sounded that those market conditions were not normal and would not last. The crash at the end of the decade revealed that many companies simply made up numbers on earnings reports to drive the increase in stock prices. High-flying companies of the 1990s such as Enron, Global Crossing, Worldcom became synonyms for fraud and a number of their top executives are still in prison.

The recession of 1991-92 was so deep it cost President George H. W. Bush his job. Despite winning a popular war, he was unseated by Bill Clinton’s laser-like focus on economic problems. Everyone remembers “The economy, stupid” sign hung at his campaign headquarters.

In 1987 the stock market lost 25% of its value on a single trading day. At today’s valuation levels that would be the equivalent of a one-day drop of 2000-points.

During the mid-1980s certificate of deposits paid double-digit interest rates. I remember owning a one-year certificate of deposit that paid 10% annual interest. I also remember a life insurance salesman running a projection on the future value of a whole life policy that he was trying to sell me. Based on just small premiums (about $100 per month) he calculated an impressive future value of over a million dollars by the time I would retire in 40 years. Of course his calculation assumed an annual interest rate of 12% in perpetuity—a laughable projection given that annual rates on money market balances today are less than 1%.

The recession of 1981-82 resulted in unemployment greater than 10%, a rate we have yet to reach in the current recession.

I could extend this list of extreme economic events and conditions indefinitely back in time. But, the above reflection on events over the past 30 years shows that it is a fallacy to believe extreme events are outside of the “norm” and unlikely to happen. Instead it is apparent that extreme events are the norm. History is not going to stop and economic conditions, whether part of a boom or bust, never continue indefinitely.

But, I have noticed a tendency for financial planners and prognosticators to assume that economic conditions of the moment—whatever conditions are at that moment—will continue indefinitely. Much of the financial advice on buying, financing, and investing in homes over the past decade was all based on the assumption that prices in the housing market would only go up. This belief mirrors beliefs in the mid-1990s that stocks could only go up. The same thinking led my life insurance salesman in the mid-1980s to argue that interest rates on savings would be in the double digits forever.

The future is always uncertain and psychologists who study how people make decisions under uncertainty have identified a long list of “cognitive biases.” A bias refers to a repeated and predictable flaw in judgment that results in making less than optimal choices. For example, if you don’t know the future, optimal choice requires acting on the basis of the most probable outcomes. But the “neglect of probability bias" results in instances where people disregard probabilities when considering future outcomes.

Failure to use seat belts is an example of the neglect of probability bias. Car crashes are low probability events. You can drive for years, even decades and never be in a car crash. But, because the probability of crashing a car is not zero and consequence of even one crash potentially catastrophic, seat belts should be worn. The fact is car cashes occur with a rate predictable enough that auto insurance companies remain financially solvent. Evidently it is not that difficult to correctly price auto insurance.

Executives in banking and investing should consider devising something akin to a “financial seatbelt.” Rather than assume market crashes are too far outside the norm to worry about, they should accept the fact that market crashes have happened in the past and will happen in the future. They should have restraints in place ahead of time to limit the damage.

Joseph Ganem is a physicist and author of the award-winning The Two Headed Quarter: How to See Through Deceptive Numbers and Save Money on Everything You Buy

Stewart versus Cramer: Is the world completely upside down?

The confrontation between John Stewart and Jim Cramer last week illustrated just how upside down and surreal the U. S. media has become. The Stewart versus Cramer dust-up actually started when Rick Santelli of CNBC made an on the air rant blasting the Obama administration’s proposal to help homeowners facing foreclosure. Santelli said in his tirade “the government is promoting bad behavior,” and referred to homeowners facing foreclosure as “losers.”

In response Stewart ran a montage of clips showcasing consistently wrong CNBC financial predictions over the past year. The “experts” at CNBC urged viewers to buy the stocks of Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and AIG, in the months before these companies imploded. A particularly embarrassing clip showed Jim Cramer on CNBC recommending Bear Stearns as a buy just weeks before the company went under.

The Daily Show With Jon StewartM - Th 11p / 10c

CNBC Gives Financial Advice

Daily Show Full Episodes
Important Things w/ Demetri Martin

Political Humor
Jim Cramer

Stewart’s point is that if the “experts” dispensing advice are so completely wrong about the future, how are average homebuyers suppose to know the future? After all, many of the “loser” homeowners went broke taking advice from “experts” like Santelli and his ilk in the financial services industry.

The feud reached a climax last Thursday night when Cramer appeared as a guest on Stewart’s show. Stewart conducted a pointed interrogation interspersed with previously unaired video clips from December 2006 of Cramer explaining to someone how to make money from short positions by spreading rumors about companies. Referring to the video, Stewart said: “I want the Jim Cramer on CNBC to protect me from that Jim Cramer.”

The Daily Show With Jon StewartM - Th 11p / 10c

Jim Cramer Unedited Interview Pt. 1

Daily Show Full Episodes
Important Things w/ Demetri Martin

Political Humor
Jim Cramer

Cramer defended himself by claiming that the CEOs of the companies he recommended lied to him. When Stewart suggested that he not take at face value what CEOs say Cramer responded with a bizarre defense. He said: “I’m not Eric Sevareid. I’m not Edward R. Morrow. I’m a guy trying to do an entertainment show about business for people to watch.”

At this point in the interview I realized what has gone so wrong in the media. The irony of this exchange is breath taking.

John Stewart bills himself as a comedian and works for a network called Comedy Central. His show—The Daily Show—is presented as a spoof of network news broadcast. Jim Cramer bills himself as a financial news reporter and works for a news network CNBC. His show—Mad Money—is promoted as serious financial analysis and investment advice.

But, when Cramer shows up as guest on Stewart’s comedy show, he is bombarded with tough, pointed, serious, questions about the soundness and ethics of the advice he dispenses. Cramer defends himself by asserting that he needs to entertain an audience that would tune out if his talk became too technical.

So a comedian is asking relevant questions while a news reporter pleads that he doesn’t ask questions because he needs to entertain. Has the world gone completely upside down? If I want real news reporting I need to watch “fake” news on the comedy channel. The “real” news people are too busy entertaining to do actual investigative reporting.

The over arching point that Stewart stressed throughout the 15-minute interview with Cramer, is that the financial reporters at CNBC are not fulfilling their responsibilities as journalists. The role of a free press is to investigate and question those in authority, not simply serve as a mouthpiece.

Much has been made of the failure of the regulatory agencies such as the SEC in the current financial meltdown. But where was the press while all of this was happening? Bernie Madoff ran a $50 billion Ponzi scheme for more than a decade while a financial analyst sent warning letters to the SEC that were ignored. No one at CNBC bothered to investigate and ask questions.

No reporter investigated or questioned AIG issuing more credit default swaps than it could ever possibly payout on. Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch all used massive amounts of leverage, in some cases more than 30 to 1, to artificially inflate their investment returns—a reckless strategy that again no reporter questioned. Instead stocks in these investment firms were touted as good buys.

While all of this was happening the reporters at CNBC were concerned about “entertaining” their viewers. Stewart said: “I understand that you want to make finance entertaining, but it’s not a fucking game.”

No it’s not a game. Real money and real livelihoods are on the line. Real hard-earned wages went into now decimated 401k and pension plans. Real tax dollars are being spent to hold off collapse of the financial system.

I believe that if the financial reporters would do their jobs they would find criminal culpability on the part of many of the executives who ran these failed companies. I don’t believe that a blow up of the entire financial system to the tune of a trillion dollars happened without actual fraud taking place. With dollar amounts that large it should not have been that hard for the so-called “experts” to figure out what was going on.

Much has been made of the need for more oversight and regulation in the financial services sector. But, the government needs to take a hard look at possible criminal violation of regulations already in place. And the journalists need to get back to holding the government and CEOs accountable by investigating and asking questions. Leave the entertaining for the comedians.

Joseph Ganem is a physicist and author of the award-winning The Two Headed Quarter: How to See Through Deceptive Numbers and Save Money on Everything You Buy

Interest-only Mortgages by Another Name

After all the carnage in the mortgage industry over the past few years, I am still amazed that many in the financial services industry still do not understand the number gimmicks that led to the mess. An op-ed piece published in the February 27, 2009 Baltimore Sun by Sim B. Sitkin a professor of management at Duke University, advocated extending mortgages to 50 or even 100 years as a way to make houses more “affordable.” That sounds like an impressive proposal for lowering monthly payments. However, whether the mortgage term is for 50, 100 or even 1000 years, monthly payments can never fall to an amount less than the interest due on the first month of the loan. In the limit of extremely long loan terms, the loan effectively becomes an interest-only agreement.

Of course Mr. Sitkin didn’t use "interest-only" as a descriptor. That label now has a negative connotation given the millions of homeowners with interest-only loans currently underwater because home prices went down while their debt did not. But lets look at how much 50 and 100-year loans differ from interest only loans. I’ve constructed tables below with some examples. Scroll down to view the tables.

30-Year $200,000 loan	5%	7%	9%
Monthly Payment	$1073	$1330	$1609
Interest paid in the first month	$833	$1166	$1500
Principal paid in the first month	$240	$164	$109
Time to pay 10% of loan (years)	6	7.7	9.6
50-Year $200,000 loan	5%	7%	9%
Monthly Payment	$908	$1203	$1517
Interest paid in the first month	$833	$1166	$1500
Principal paid in the first month	$75	$37	$17
Time to pay 10% of loan (years)	15	20.5	25.4
100-Year $200,000 loan	5%	7%	9%
Monthly Payment	$839.04	$1167.75	$1500.19
Interest paid in the first month	$833.33	$1166.66	$1500
Principal paid in the first month	$5.71	$1.09	$0.19
Time to pay 10% of loan (years)	55	67.2	74.4

Here are some numerical facts from these tables.

First note that a 100-year mortgage proposed by Mr. Sitkin is for all practical purposes an interest-only loan. No significant debt reduction will take place in the borrower’s lifetime.

Second any advantages that a 50-year loan would have over a 30-year loan in reducing monthly payments diminishes at higher interest rates. The difference in monthly payments been a 30-year and 50-year mortgage decreases as interest rates increase. Also the amount allocated towards principal in the early years of the mortgage becomes less for both 30 and 50-year loans at higher interest rates.

Mr. Sitkin used 5% as an example interest rate. However, I pointed out in a letter to the editor that the Baltimore Sun published that “to get a lender to commit to so long a loan would probably require paying a higher rate than the historically low 5 percent mortgage rate used in the example. In that case, the numbers get much worse for the borrower.”

My published letter provoked a response from Mr. Richard T. Webb, CEO of Atlantic Financial Federal Credit Union, that the Baltimore Sun published on March 8. In his letter he made two statements I find puzzling. In response to my assertion that interest rates would be higher for a 50-year loan compared to a 30-year loan he wrote:

“And from the point of view of the lending institution, I'd rather own a long-term 5 percent loan than have a bankruptcy judge cram down a mortgage payment.”

This prompted me to check the loan rate page on his credit union’s Website. I found the same pattern for interest rates on that page that I find at every other financial institution—the longer the loan’s term the high the interest rate. On the Baltimore Sun’s business page today, the average rate for 15-year mortgages rate is 4.76% and for 30-year mortgages 5.17%. Although those numbers fluctuate daily, every single day the 30-year rate is greater than the 15-year rate. I have no reason to believe that the pattern of higher rates for longer loans would not continue for loan terms beyond 30 years.

The other puzzling assertion he made is that I failed “to consider the length of time most homeowners keep a mortgage.” He wrote:

“It's highly unusual for a homeowner to keep a mortgage for 30 years. The average time a mortgage is held is around seven to nine years. Extending the repayment period would achieve the desired effect of reducing the monthly mortgage payment. Wouldn't it make sense to be making smaller payments on a longer-term loan when the chances of staying in a house for 30 years are small?”

But isn’t that the reason why a homebuyer should avoid a 50-year loan? Again look at the numbers in my table above. Homebuyers who don’t pay down debt are at the whim of the market when it comes to refinancing or selling. If home prices rise they can sell or refinance. But, if prices fall homeowners have negative equity. No bank or lending institution will finance a home with negative equity. If rates fall, homeowners cannot refinance to take advantage of the lower rate for homes with negative equity.

Events of the past few years have shown that the assumption that home prices can only rise over time is false. But financial institutions are still dispensing advice based on that underlying assumption.

I still stand by my concluding paragraph in my letter to the Sun. Focusing only on monthly payments with no long-term plan for paying down the debt is one of the root causes of the housing crisis. Homebuyers would be better served with monthly payments that allow them to build equity, even if it means scaling down or deferring their homebuying choices.

Joseph Ganem is a physicist and author of the award-winning The Two Headed Quarter: How to See Through Deceptive Numbers and Save Money on Everything You Buy